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I.
ARGUMENT
A.
THE RECORD DOES NOT REASONABLY SUPPORT THE
CONCLUSION THAT MR. GREEN, IN EFFECT/
ABANDONED HIS JOB
Begining at page 17 of its brief/ respondent Board of
Review (sometimes hereinafter refered to as the Board) argues
that the UTA's request that plaintiff James Green sign an
"accident commitment" was a reasonable request which would have
at least allowed him to preserve his employment while he looked
for another job.

Therefore- the Board's arguement goes ; Mr.

Green in effect abandoned his job despite the clear,
uncontroverted evidence that he was told; "You're fired". (R.63)
and then received a letter stating "effective immediately your
employment . . .

is terminated". (R.76)

Characterization of the request as "reasonable" is
dependant on a finding that Mr* Green was asked to sign a
commitment not to have further preventable accidents for twelve
months.

As argued in Plaintiff's Opening Brief/ there is no

evidence in the record to support a conclusion that Mr. Green was
asked to sign a commitment not to be involved in a preventable
accident.

Instead/ the testimony offered at the administrative

hearing was only to the effect that he was asked to commit to
"not have any more accidents." (R.51)
The difference is critical,

By being asked to commit

to "not have any more accidents"/ any control Mr. Green otherwise
had over his own job security was eliminated.

Had Mr. Green

signed a commitment worded in the manner described by the UTA's
1

representative at the administrative hearing, he would have been
subject to immediate termination had he been involved in any
accident, whether one caused by an act of God or one resulting
solely from another driver's negligence, such as would likely be
the case were Mr. Green's bus rearended by another vehicle.

Such

a tenuous hold on his employment was understandably unacceptable
to Mr. Green.
At page 22 of its brief, the Board argues that the
record as a whole supports the finding that Mr. Green was
requested only to commit to having no preventable accidents.

On

the contrary, the most that can be said from review of the whole
record is that it was apparantly the UTA's subjective intent that
Mr. Green commit to no preventable accidents.

Every objective

manifestation to Mr. Green was that his only option to
termination was to commit to not be involved in any more
accidents. (R.51; 62; 63; 67; 69)
The Board argues that the UTA's policy was to
discipline drivers only for preventable accidents and thus the
commitment Mr. Green was asked to make must have been with
reference to preventable accidents.

In so arguing, the Board

forgets that when asked to commit in writing to no more
accidents, Mr. Green had already been involved in enough
preventable accidents to sustain a decision by the UTA to
terminate him.

At that point in time the UTA was free to impose

any condition to his continued employment it wished, no matter
how onerous.

Assume that after being involved in three

preventable accidents the UTA offered Mr. Green the opportunity
2

to keep his employment but only if he were to agree to drive a
bus at a wage rate of $1 per day.

If Mr. Green were to reject

that option and was then fired (and ignoring any minimum wage law
implications) is there any doubt that the Court would reject an
argument that he should have accepted the offer in order to
preserve his employment while looking for other employment?
writer thinks not.

This

Thus, the question reverts to the

reasonableness of the request that Mr. Green commit to not be
invo.lved in any more accidents in order to keep his job.
Other factors advanced by the Board in support of its
argument that the record as a whole shows that Mr. Green was only
asked to commit to noninvolvement in preventable accidents are
also without merit.

The Board points out that in his appeal from

the Administrative Law Judge's decision/ Mr. Green stated/ "It is
against my moral value to sign a document stating that I will not
have another preventable accident . . .."/ and argues that the
statement exhibits an awareness that Mr. Green was only asked to
commit to having no more preventable accidents.

Obviously/ that

statement in his appeal came after he had read the Administrative
Law Judge's findings.

The statement is irrelevant to a

determination of Mr. Green's state of mind when asked to make a
commitment.
The introduction into evidence at the administrative
hearing of a written commitment to avoid preventable accidents
signed by another driver is also irrelevant to Mr. Green's
understanding of the condition sought to be imposed.

Mr. Green

testified that he never saw a commitment reduced to writing
3

(R.58) and the UTA ! s representative admitted that a commitment
for Mr. Green's signature was not reduced to writing. (R.57)
Finally, the Board argues at page 24 of its brief, that
had Mr. Green signed a commitment then had another accident, an
investigation of the accident would have been submitted to the
Accident Review Corraittee and no action taken against him if it
were determined to have been unpreventable. The argument is
completely speculative with no basis in the record.
In sum, the record clearly reveals that Mr. Green was
terminated.

It is respectfully submitted that the condition

which the UTA sought to impose on Mr. Green was not the arguably
reasonable request that he avoid further preventable accidents.
1 .stead, as testified to by Ms. McCall (R.51), Mr. Green was
asked to make an unreasonable commitment that he "not have any
more accidents", thus leaving his prospects for continued
employment at the peril of every other driver on the road.

If

Mr. Green is to be denied benefits, the denial must be based on a
finding that he was terminated for "just cause" as that term is
used in Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1).
B.
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT MR. GREEN'S
DRIVING RECORD PROVIDED "JUST CAUSE" FOR
HIS TERMINATION
In Point IV of its brief, the Board appears to
acknowledge that Continental Oil Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus.
Comm., Utah, 568 P.2d 727 (1977), would be controlling absent
subsequent statutory amendments.

In Continental Oil this court

held that, under the facts there presented, an employee
4

terminated from his employment solely on the basis of his driving
record could not be denied benefits on the ground that the
termination was for misconduct.

The Board aptly points out that

Continental Oil was decided prior to the 1983 addition of the
phrase "for just cause" in Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1).

The

Board does acknowledge that "just cause" for discharging an
employee requires that there be "some fault on the part of the
employee involved".

Department of Employment Security Rules and

Regulations, Proposed Rule A71-07-1:5(II)-l.A.2.

The Board,

however, makes the unwarranted assumption that the UTA's
determination that Mr. Green's accidents were "preventable"
necessarily means that Mr. Green was at fault, as the word
"fault" is used in the Department's Proposed Rules.
There is no evidence in the record that before the UTA
determines an accident to be "preventable" it must find that the
involved driver was "negligent" as that term is applied in tort
law*

To the contrary, when a UTA bus operator is involved in an

accident the UTA Accident Review Committee makes "a determination
of whether the accident was due to operator error or whether it
was just something that the operator could have done nothing to
avoid". (R.48)(emphasis added)

Or, as found by the

Administrative Law Judge, the committee "makes a determination as
to whether the accident was preventable by the driver, or

1. Negligence is, of course, the failure to do what a
reasonable and prudent person would have done under the
circumstances. West Union Canal Co. v. Provo Bench Canal &
Irrigation Co., 116 Utah 128, 208 P.2d 1119 (1949).
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completely beyond the driver's control", (R.40)(emphasis added)
Thus, it appears that "preventable" as used by the UTA
when evaluating bus accidents, is lower on a scale of relative
culpability than is "negligence".

On the other hand, "fault", as

determined with reference to the Proposed Rules, is higher on a
culpability scale than "negligence".

Proposed Rule

A71-07-l:5(II)-l.A.5. states,
"5. Fault may not be established when the reason for
discharge is based on such things as mere mistakes,
inefficiency, failure of performance as the result of
inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated
instances, good-faith errors in judgment or in the
exercise of discretion, minor but casual or
unintentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These
examples are not disqualifying because of the lack of
knowledge or control. . .." (emphasis added)
Thus, in determining fault the Proposed Rules adopt
standards very similar to those set forth in Continental Oil Co.,
supra, and Martin v. Department of Employment Security, Utah, 682
P.2d 304 (1984).
Without evidence as to the particulars of Mr. Green's
accidents, the Board's evaluation (Respondents' Brief, pages
26-29) of culpability, knowledge and control, the three elements
of "fault" as that term is used in the Proposed Rules, is of
little or no help.

All that can be determined from the record is

that Mr. Green's accidents were "preventable", i.e., not
completely beyond the driver's control. (R.40)
After Mr. Green was initially granted unemployment
benefits (R.40), it was the employer's burden at the
administrative hearing to establish "just cause".

Proposed Rule

A71-07-l:5(II)-l.B.l., quoted at page 7 of Respondents' Brief.
6

Given the facts that were placed into the record in this case/ a
finding of "fault" and thus "just cause" for Mr. Green's
termination can only be reached if the Proposed Rule quoted above
is completely ignored.
It should also be noted that the above-quoted Proposed
Rule contemplates that plural instances of inadvertance or
good-faith errors in judgment will not necessarily be
disqualifying.

The Board's characterization (Respondents' Brief,

page 27) of Mr. Green's driving record as involving "repeated
incidents of preventable accidents" is harsh, even if technically
correct.
14, 1984.

Mr. Green was involved in a "minor" accident on January
360 days later, on January 8, 1985, he was involved in

two more "minor1' accidents.
When driving his route/ Mr. Green was faced with
competing interests similar to those of the employee in Martin v.
Department of Employment Security/ supra/ 682 P.2d 304, discussed
in Respondents' Brief at pages 30-31.

Here, Mr. Green was

disciplined for being involved in preventable accidents which he
testified occured on icy roads.

Mr. Green could also have been

disciplined for not meeting his bus route schedule, absent valid
2
reason for delay.
Given such competing job performance
obligations, it is not surprising that occasional "preventable"
accidents occur during winter weather.
2. Admittedly/ the UTA Policies and Procedure Manual for Coach
Operators/ on which plaintiff bases his assertion/ is not a part
of the record.
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Finally/ the Board attempts to distinguish the
Continental Oil Co, case by pointing out that the employee in
that case/ after being involved in the accident which
precipitated his termination/ was acquitted of a charge of
driving under the influence of alcohol.

On the other hand/ there

was a determination in the instant case that Mr. Green1s
accidents were preventable.

The different burden of proof in the

Continental Oil Co. employee's criminal case renders the
distinction null.
C.
MR. GREEN'S FAILURE TO FILE A UNION GRIEVANCE
IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUES HEREIN
At various places in its brief/ the Board of Review
points out that Mr. Green failed to grieve his termination
through his u.ion.
irrelevant.

His failure to contest the termination is

The issue in this case is not whether Mr. Green was

discharged in violation of his union's contract/ or whether he
might have a civil cause of action for wrongful discharge.
Instead/ the issue is whether he was discharged for reasons that
disqualify him from unemployment benefits.

The Board presents no

authority for the proposition that Mr. Green was required to
exhaust his remedies for continued employment through a union
grievance before he could qualify for unemployment benefits.
Indeed/ no such authority can be found.
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II.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff James Green respectfully submits that this
Court should enter its order reversing the decision of the Board
of Review and remand the matter to the Industrial Commission with
directions to enter an order declaring plaintiff eligible for
unemployment benefits and reinstating benefits in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-3.
/^//
fa
CAMP*
Dated this J/'" day of November", 1985.

Steven H. Lybbfert
Attorney for Plaintiff
James Green

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the f^f/k

day of December, 1985/ I

hand delivered four (4) copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to
Lorin R. Blauer, Special Assistant Attorney general/ 1234 South
Main Street/ Salt Lake City, Utah.

Steven H.^Lybbert
Attorney for Plaintiff
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